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The Role of Land Certification in Reducing Gender Gaps in 
Productivity in Rural Ethiopia 
Mintewab Bezabih and Stein Holden 
Abstract 
The importance of providing secure land rights to smallholder farmers in developing countries 
is now widely recognized. In line with this, our paper analyzes the impact of land certification on 
boosting productivity of female-headed households in Ethiopia, which are believed to be systematically 
more tenure insecure than their male counterparts. Based on parametric and semi-parametric analyses, 
the impact of certification on plot-level productivity is positive and significant. However, certification 
has different impacts on male and female productivity:  male-headed households gain significantly and 
women gain only modestly. Hence, the results indicate that, while certification is clearly beneficial to 
farm-level productivity, it does not necessarily lead to more gains for female-headed households. 
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The Role of Land Certification in Reducing Gender Gaps in 
Productivity in Rural Ethiopia 
Mintewab Bezabih and Stein Holden∗ 
Introduction 
Gender gaps in agricultural productivity have been documented by many studies across 
the developing world. In Ethiopia, for instance, Holden et al. (2001) found that land productivity 
differentials between male- and female-headed households persist in farms in the Ethiopian 
highlands, even after controlling for the impact of market imperfections. Similarly, in Nepal, 
male-managed farms produce more per hectare, accompanied by a higher value of marginal 
product per adult family males than adult family females (Sridhar 2008). In addition, 
Quisumbing (1996) argued that allocative efficiency differentials exist across male- and female-
headed households, due to endogenous input choices and intra-household resource allocations. 
Even within the same household, empirical evidence from Burkina Faso (Udry 1996) showed 
that plots controlled by women are farmed much less intensively than similar plots within the 
household controlled by men. Other studies have found a systematic downward bias in the 
productivity of female-owned plots in Africa and Asia (Tikabo 2003; Agarwal 2003; and Cook 
1999). 
A number of studies point to lack of access to resources (particularly land) faced by rural 
women in the developing world as major sources of their economic underperformance.1 Based 
on a critical analysis of cases from five South Asian countries, Agarwal (1994) argued that the 
single most important economic factor affecting rural women’s situations is the gender gap in 
command of arable land:  few women have ownership rights to land and even fewer have control 
over it, in terms of production and management decisions. Across Africa, women’s rights to 
property derive from men in the household and may be coupled with obligations and other 
                                                 
∗ Mintewab Bezabih, CEMARE (Center for the Economics and Management of Aquatic Resources), University of 
Portsmouth, St. George’s Building, 41 High Street, PO12HY Portsmouth, UK, (email) 
Mintewab.bezabih@port.ac.uk; and Stein Holden, Department of Economics and Resource Management, 
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1 Women also face an array of constraints in their day-to-day economic activities, including access to extension 
services (e.g., Mutimba and Bekele 2002; Saito and Spurling 1992), to credit (e.g., Barham and Chitemi 2008), and 
to output markets (Rashid and Townsend 1993; de Mel et al. 2007). Other studies have associated lack of control of 
resources by women with lower agricultural productivity (Quisumbing 1996).  Environment for Development  Bezabih and Holden 
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restrictions regarding use of land (Okali 1983; Goheen 1988, 90–105; Derman et al. 2007; Dey 
1981; Yngstrom 2002; Roberts 1988, 97–114).  
In this paper, we assess the impact of the recent curtailments in the rapid and low-cost 
rural land certification program in Ethiopia, which was intended to relieve the inherent insecurity 
of tenure in land holdings and ease constraints to participation in the land markets by improving 
the productivity of female land owners. Our analysis adds to the existing literature on the 
relationship between land reforms and economic performance in two significant ways. 
First, the impact of land reforms on the economic performance of female-headed 
households has rarely been studied. Because land is a critical resource, there have been a number 
of revisions of land legislation (some with direct and indirect provisions to improve women’s 
land rights). However, the literature investigating the impact of interventions on the livelihoods 
of female farmers is still relatively thin and is mainly qualitative analysis. Exceptions include 
Holden, Deininger, and Ghebru (2009), who showed that, as a result of the land certification 
program, female heads of household in Tigray, Ethiopia, were more likely to rent out land. The 
systematic lower tenure security of women before the certification and their reliance on the land-
lease market to start seems to support this.  
Second, assessment of the efficiency and equity of land reforms has yielded decidedly 
mixed results. Because land reforms help secure property rights, they are expected to lead to a 
number of benefits. Deininger et al. (2007) argued that these benefits could include incentives for 
land-related investment, enhanced gender equality and bargaining power by women, improved 
governance, reduced conflict potential, and lower transaction costs for productivity-enhancing 
land transfers (either rental or sale).2 In line with this, Holden, Xu, and Jiang (2009) showed that 
forest tenure reforms in China, which instituted written documentation of forest land rights, in 
the form of forest land certificates for a specific time period, enhances tenure security beyond 
what other perceived use-rights to land do. Similarly, in their study of the impact of low-cost 
                                                 
2 The broader literature on rural land security provides strong evidence that in many cases secure tenure improves 
the livelihoods of the rural poor through increased investment, land market participation, and productivity. In many 
instances, tenure security is found to correlate with management or conservation investments on the land (Besley 
1995; Sjaastad and Bromley 1997; Holden and Yohannes 2002; Deininger and Jin 2006). Similarly, evidence of the 
impact of participation in the land-rental market also supports this claim (e.g., Ghebru and Holden 2008, 74–92; 
Lunduka et al. 2009; Gebreselassie 2005). 
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land certification in the Amhara region of Ethiopia, Deininger et al. (2009) found that the land 
reform increased soil conservation investment and participation in the land rental market.  
However, empirical evidence of the impact of land reform does not always ensure that 
land reforms live up to intended objectives. For instance, land titling in Kenya brought little 
increase in land market activity (Place and Migot-Adholla 1998); Jacoby and Minten (2005) 
found the same results in a similar study in Madagascar. In some instances, land titling programs 
benefit the wealthy and powerful at the expense of the poor and marginalized (Besley and 
Burgess 2000; Cotula et al. 2004; Deininger et al. 2003). Even where legislation does strengthen 
women’s property rights, lack of legal knowledge and weak implementation may limit women’s 
ability to exercise their rights (Deininger et al. 2008). 
In sum, the degree of success of a particular land reform could be dependent on the 
features of the reform and the pre-existing tenure structure, as well as the adequate institutional 
infrastructure supporting the reform so that it attains its desirable outcomes (Deininger et al. 
2009). Hence, the impact of land certification in Ethiopia on the productivity of female-headed 
households should be investigated on its own merits. Accordingly, this paper assesses the 
mechanisms by which the program can contribute to reducing the gender gaps in the productivity 
of male- and female-headed households in Ethiopia.  
This paper hypothesizes two ways that land certification can help reduce the gender gap 
in economic performance. First, increased tenure security, as a direct outcome of certification, 
should increase the productivity of female-headed households by increasing, for instance, land-
related investment. Second, tenure security encourages female-headed households to participate 
in the land rental market,3 which typically involves land transfer to more efficient operators. 
Bellemare (2009) argued that tenure security is an important factor in land transaction behavior.  
To compare the patterns of productivity among the sample plots before and after 
certification, we used a “difference-in-differences” approach. The role of certification is 
identified as the estimated difference-in-differences of productivity pre- and post-certification 
between the two groups of plots. Following Deininger et al. (2009), who applied a similar 
methodology to the analysis of the impact of land certification on tenure security and investment 
                                                 
3 Female-headed households are heavily reliant on the land-rental market as a mechanism to adjust their factor 
endowments to cultivated land because of the shortage of male labor for farming activities (Bezabih and Holden 
2009).  
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in soil conservation activities, we selected plots that received certification in the year 2005 as 
treatment plots, and designated plots that did not receive certification prior to, or in 2005, as the 
control plots. Our major findings indicate that, while certification consistently increases overall 
plot productivity, the systematic link between certification and gender gaps in productivity is less 
consistent and more dependent on the nature of land rentals that female-headed households 
engage in. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 gives a brief background on Ethiopian land 
policy, women’s land rights, and certification. The estimation methodology, along with some 
considerations in the estimation procedure, is provided in section 2. Section 3 details the survey 
design and data employed in the empirical analysis. Section 4 presents the empirical findings and 
section 5 concludes the paper. 
1. Ethiopian Land Policy, Women’s Land Rights, and Land Certification 
Prior to 1975, Ethiopia’s long, feudalistic system of land tenure rarely recognized 
independent land ownership by women, except through marriage and inheritance. While women 
could inherit land from their parents or deceased husbands, they could not own land in their own 
right (Crummy 2000).  
The Derg4 regime that overthrew the last imperial government in 1975 abruptly instituted 
a series of measures that changed the political and economic landscape of the country from a 
feudal system to a socialist state (Kebede 2002). Among the many radical measures, the land 
reform proclamation of February 1975 nationalized all rural lands, announcing that all land was 
owned by the state and given to farmers on a right-to-use (usufruct) basis, organized via peasant 
associations (Kebede 2008). The farmers’ membership in the peasant associations made them 
claimants, endowed with rights, such as access, some management rights, and limited exclusion 
rights. Per the 1975 legislation, spouses enjoyed joint ownership of the land, implying that on 
paper men and women were entitled to the same land rights. However, women’s rights to land 
depended on marriage and were not registered separately; they therefore had no control of the 
land (Crewett et al. 2008). 
                                                 
4 A repressive communist military junta in power in Ethiopia from the 1970s through the end of the 1980s, headed 
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The EPRDF-led5 government that overthrew the military government (Derg) in 1991 
largely maintained the land policy of its predecessor, keeping all rural and urban land under 
public (government) ownership (Gebreselassie 2006). Significant changes included formal 
confirmation that land rights were to be granted to men and women, including the right to lease 
out land. However, most regions limited the period of the lease and restricted leasing rights to 
only a share of the farmland. The severe limitations in these provisions still exist, particularly for 
women. For instance, divorced women lack secure land rights, due to numerous exceptions 
which strictly curtail these rights (Crewett et al. 2008). 
Pre-existing land-tenure systems in many developing countries are characterized as rigid 
and highly intertwined with sociocultural customs, leaving huge room for efficient reforms 
(Nega et al. 2003). Women, in particular, are often disadvantaged by both statutory and 
traditional land-tenure systems (Agarwal 1994; Lastarria-Cornhiel 1997; Kevane and Gary 
1999). They have weak property and contractual rights to land, water, and other natural resources 
(Quisimberg et al. 2009). 
 Since the 1990s, most African countries have passed new land legislation to remedy 
some of the perceived shortcomings of existing systems, particularly by strengthening customary 
land rights, recognizing occupancy short of full title, improving female land ownership, and 
decentralizing land administration (Deininger et al. 2009). However, whether these moves have 
improved the status of women remains debatable. In some cases, privatization has led to different 
land rights being concentrated in the hands of a few people, while other people (such as poor 
rural women or ethnic minorities) lose the few rights they have and generally are not able to 
participate fully in the land market (Lastarria-Cornhiel, 1997). In addition, Khadiagala (2001) 
and Tripp (2004) argued that traditional institutions suffer from a limited ability to deal with 
gender-related conflict and tend to be gender-biased. Even with recent reforms, gender equality 
has not been thoroughly addressed.6  
Among other equity and efficiency concerns, the land certification program in Ethiopia 
attempts to address gender bias concerns of the current land-tenure system. The program issues a 
non-alienable joint certificate to both spouses that confers equity and joint land ownership. The 
certificates include maps of the land and photos of both husband and wife. Women are also 
                                                 
5 EPRDF (Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front) is the ruling political coalition in Ethiopia. 
6 Many African countries have recently revised their land legislation to offer greater tenure security to land users, 
recognize traditional arrangements, and strengthen women’s rights (Deininger et al. 2006). Environment for Development  Bezabih and Holden 
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actively involved in the certification process, and the land administration committees at the 
kebele 7 level are required to have at least one female member (Deininger et al. 2007).8 
2. Empirical Methodology and Estimation Considerations 
An ideal setting to evaluate impact would require that participants and nonparticipants 
have the same ex-ante chance of participating in the program. The implication is that observed or 
unobserved attributes prior to the introduction of the program have no impact on the likelihood 
of actual participation. In reality, however, evaluation of impact generally involves deliberate 
placement of participants in the treatment and control groups, reflecting both the choices made 
by those eligible and the administrative assignment of the opportunities to participate. The 
factors, then, upon which participation in the program is based can be observable to the 
researcher. However, factors unobserved by the evaluator, but known to those deciding 
participation and influencing outcomes, could also come into play. Thus, a study evaluating 
impact needs to address selection bias stemming from inadequate controls for observable 
heterogeneity plus bias stemming from unobservables (Ravallion 2007).  
Addressing selection bias for observables can, in principle, be assessed using linear 
regression models. Nonparametric methods are superior in this case because selection of 
observables is related to the assumption of no distributional or functional forms. When 
involvement in the program is independent of outcomes, given the observables, then the relevant 
summary statistic to be balanced between the two groups is the conditional probability of 
participation, called the “propensity score” (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). The probabilities that 
a valid comparison group can be found is termed the region of common support.  
Non-random participation also yields a bias if some of the variables that jointly influence 
outcomes and program involvement are unobserved by the evaluator.  
                                                 
7 The land administration committee is a grass roots, kebele-level (the smallest administrative unit in Ethiopia) 
structure responsible for the issuance of certificates. 
8 This could be seen as part of a comprehensive effort by governments and development practitioners to improve the 
conditions of rural women. A significant number of studies documents promising interventions to improve women’s 
health, education, and nutritional status (see, for example, King et al. 2007; Allen and Gillespie 2001, both cited in 
Quisimberg et al. 2009). 
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2.1  Semi-Parametric Approach 
The first step of computing a propensity score in propensity score matching is to estimate 
a standard probit or logit participation model with control variables. The predicted values are 
used to estimate the propensity score for each observation in the participant and the non-
participant samples. The comparison group is then formed by picking the “nearest neighbor” 
with similar characteristics for each participant (Jalan and Ravallion 2003) to test for systematic 
differences in the covariates between the treatment and comparison groups constructed by 
propensity score matching.  
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) showed that matching on the propensity score is equivalent 
to matching on all the observed covariates. Based on this property, the propensity score can also 
be used to delineate the common support group, where the non-participants have the same 
propensity score that is higher than some cut-off level.  
The propensity score is given by:  
() P r ( 1 | ) ( | ) ex w X x EwX x ≡= = = =  (1) 
where w is the indicator of exposure to treatment, and x is the multidimensional vector of 
pretreatment characteristics. Accordingly, the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) can 
be estimated as: 
0 { [ ( | 1)],Pr( )} { ( | 0),Pr( )| 1}} o A T T EEyw x Ey w x w == − = =  (2) 
2.2  Parametric Approach and the Difference-in-Differences Method 
The basic intuition of the difference-in-differences approach is that to study the impact of 
some “treatment,” one compares the performance of the treatment group pre- and post-treatment, 
relative to the performance of some control group pre- and post-treatment. In principle, the 
control group shows what would have happened to the treatment group in the absence of any 
treatment—a no-treatment group (Slaughter 2001). In our case, this suggests that one can 
compare the level of productivity of plots given certificates pre- and post-certification to the 
productivity of control plots pre- and post-certification.  
Our parametric regression analysis proceeds as follows. First, the relationships between 
the gender of the household head and land productivity are specified to establish the existence of 
significant productivity differences between farms owned by male and female household heads. Environment for Development  Bezabih and Holden 
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The productivity equation is then relaxed to take into account land certification and land leasing 
behavior.  
2.3  Basic Productivity Analysis   
Our assessment of the relationship between gender of the household head and plot-level 
productivity is given by:   
ln( ) pit it it pit pit yS g X u αϖ γ μ =+ + + +   (3) 
where, for household i, plot p, and year t, ln( ) pit y  is the log of the value of output per hectare; 
it S represents socioeconomic characteristics, excluding gender;  pit X  is a vector of physical plot 
characteristics; and  pit u  is an error term. 






if S X u
L
otherwise
βγ ⎧ ++ > ⎪ = ⎨
⎪ ⎩
 (4) 
where  pit L  is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the plot is leased out. 
A similar specification applies to self-managed and rented-out plots, as given in 
equations (5) and (6), respectively:  
*
NN N N N N N N N N N
pit it it pit pit pit yS g X i m r u αϖ γ μ η =+ + + + +  and (5) 
*
RR R R R R R R R R R
pit it it pit pit pit yS g X i m r u αϖ γ μ η =+ + + + +  (6) 
where the superscripts N and R represent self-managed and rented-out plots, respectively. The 
variable imr stands for the inverse Mill’s ratio from the plot rent equation.  
2.4  Extended Productivity Analysis with Certification 
In considering the possible impact of certification on plot-level productivity, we extended 
the framework in equations (3), (4), and (5) by including the impacts of certification. 
Accordingly, the pooled productivity equation is given by:   
ln( ) * pit it it pit it pit pit pit yS g c g c X u αϖ γ ϑ φ μ =+ + + + + +   (7) Environment for Development  Bezabih and Holden 
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where  pit c represents the certificate variable, defined as a dummy variable. (1 represents the post-
treatment period if plot p and household i are located in the treated village, and 0 otherwise.) In 
addition, equations (4) and (5), representing rented-out and self-managed plots, respectively, are 
extended in the same manner to account for the impacts of certification.  
All the equations are estimated using the both random effects and Mundlak’s fixed 
effects estimators. To elaborate on our use of these alternative estimators, we set up an equation 
that decomposes the error term it ξ  into a fixed effect  i α and a random noise,  it u :  
it i it u ξ α =+   (8) 
The random effects estimator is based on the implicit assumption of no correlation 
between the fixed effect  i α  and the regressors/observed covariates (Wooldrige 2001). A 
violation of the assumption underlying the random effects specification that  (| 0 ) it it Ey Z = , 
where  it Z equals all observed covariates in equations (3) through (7), leads to biased parameter 
estimates. To remedy this, Mundlak (1978) suggested explicitly modeling the relationship 
between time-varying regressors  it Z  and the unobservable effect  i α  in an auxiliary regression. 
Adding the pseudo fixed effects, or the Mundlak-Chamberlain’s random effects model, would 
control for the fixed effect without having to rely on the data transformation in the fixed-effects 
estimator and the associated shortcoming of removing any time-constant explanatory variables 
along with  i α . 
3. The Data 
The data in this analysis came from the Sustainable Land Management Survey conducted 
in 2005 and 2007, in two zones of the Amhara National Regional State in Ethiopia. A total of 14 
villages were included in the study, 7 from East Gojjam and the other 7 from South Wollo. East 
Gojjam has a greater agricultural potential than South Wollo.  Table 1 presents the distribution of 
plots by treatment, rental, and gender categories.  
Table 1. Distribution of Plots by Certification, Treatment, and Gender 
  No treatment  Treatment 
Total 
 Male  Female  Male  Female 
Self-managed 4,389  436  3,700  552  9,077 
Rented out  1,101  169  695  120  2,085 
Total 5490  605  4,395  672  11,162 Environment for Development  Bezabih and Holden 
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As seen in table 1, the no-treatment category has more plots than the treatment category. 
The proportion of rented plots in the two categories is closer:  there are 20 percent more rented 
plots in the no-treatment category than the treatment category. Slightly more males owned plots 
in the no-treatment category, while the opposite holds for female-owned plots. This implies that 
there has been, on average, more female participation in certification (i.e., registering and being 
issued certification for plots they farm). Looking at the rental categories, the descriptive statistics 
show that, after certification, land rentals by women increased slightly, while land rentals by men 
decreased.  
Table 2. Description of Variables Used in the Regressions 
Variable name  Variable description 
     Socioeconomic characteristics  
Sex of household head  1 = female household head, 0 = male household head 
Age of household head  Household head’s age (in years) 
Age of household head squared  The square of the household head’s age (in years)  
Household head able to read  Household head’s formal education (1 = read only; 0 = other) 
Household head able to write  Head’s formal education (1 = read and write; 0 = other) 
Household head illiterate  Head’s formal education (1 = illiterate; 0 = other) 
Adult male labor per hectare  The number of male working-age family members of the landlord 
per hectare 
Adult female labor per hectare  The number of female working-age family members of the 
landlord per hectare 
Adult male labor per hectare 
squared  
The square of the number of male working-age family members 
of the landlord per hectare 
Adult female labor per hectare 
squared 
The square of the number of female working-age family 
members of the landlord per hectare 
No. of oxen per hectare  The number of oxen per hectare 
No. of livestock per hectare  The number of livestock per hectare 
Total farm size   Total farm size (in hectares) 
     Physical plot characteristics  
Fertile plot   Fertile plot (1 = fertile; 0 = not fertile) 
Medium fertile plot   Medium fertile plot (1 = medium fertile; 0 = not medium fertile) 
Infertile plot   Infertile plot (1 = infertile; 0 = not infertile) 
Other plot-fertility category  Other plot-fertility category (1 = other fertile; 0 = not other fertile 
category) 
Black soil   Black soil in plot (1 = black; 0 = not black) 
Red soil   Red soil in plot (1 = red; 0 = not red) 
Grey soil   Grey soil in plot (1 = grey; 0 = not grey) Environment for Development  Bezabih and Holden 
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Sandy soil   Sandy soil on plot (1 = sandy; 0 = not sandy) 
Dark red soil   Dark red soil in plot (1 = dark red; 0 = not dark red) 
Flat plot  Flat plot (1 = flat; 0 = not flat) 
Medium slope   Medium sloped plot (1 = medium; 0 = not medium) 
Steep slope   Steep sloped plot (1 = steep; 0 = not steep) 
Plot distance from homestead   Distance of the plot from homestead (in minutes walking) 
Plot size   Total plot size (in hectares) 
     Input application 
Fertilizer in kg/ha  Fertilizer applied on plot per hectare 
Manure in kg/ha  Manure applied on plot per hectare 
     Tenure security variables 
Household's expectation of 
increase in land holdings 
Dummy variable for whether the household expects increase in 
land holdings  (1 = yes; 0 = no) 
Household's expectation of 
decrease in land holdings 
Dummy variable for whether the household expects decrease in 
land holdings  (1 = yes; 0 = no) 
Household's expectation of no 
change in land holdings 
Dummy variable for whether the household expects no change 
in land holdings  (1 = yes; 0 = no) 
Household's expectation of 
uncertainty in future land holdings 
Dummy variable for whether the household is uncertain about 
change in land holdings  (1 = yes; 0 = no) 
     Plot distribution by rental categories 
Self-managed plots  A dummy variable indicating whether the plot is managed by the 
owner or not (1 = owner; 0 = no) 
Rented-out plots  A dummy variable indicating whether the plot is rented out (1 = 
rented out; 0 = no) 
     Landlord-tenant relationships 
Landlord (male and female) with 
blood-related tenant 
A dummy variable indicating whether the tenant is a blood 
relation or not (1 = blood relation; 0 = no) 
Female landlord with blood-related 
tenant 
A dummy variable indicating whether the tenant is a blood 
relative if the landlord is a female 
Landlord (male and female) with in-
law tenant 
A dummy variable indicating whether the tenant is an in-law or 
not 
Female landlord with in-law tenant  A dummy variable indicating whether the tenant is an in-law if 
the landlord is a female 
     Dependent variables   
Plots in the treatment category  Plots in the certificate village  (1 = treatment; 0 = no) 
Plots in the treatment category for 
ethyear = 1999 
Plots in the certificate village for the Ethiopian year 1999 (1 = 
treatment; 0 = no) 
Value of plot output per hectare  The log of the value of output per hectare Environment for Development  Bezabih and Holden 
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Table 2 gives a detailed definition of the variables used in the regressions. Descriptive 
statistics of the characteristics of plots and sample households in the survey, along with tenant-
landlord relationships, are presented in table 3 below. The first two columns in table 3 presents 
the characteristics of participants and nonparticipants in the certification program, and the third 
and fourth columns in the table give the description by gender.  
Slightly over half the respondents in the sample never attended school. That fraction is 
slightly higher in the no-treatment category, while the proportion of household heads who can 
read and write is higher in the treatment category. In the no-treatment category, the average 
number of male and female adult members per hectare of land is 1.367 and 1.323, respectively; 
these figures are slightly higher for the treatment category. The average holdings size is 1.765 
hectares in the no-treatment group, and 1.968 in the treatment category. The distribution of plot 
characteristics in the two certification groups is uniform. Environment for Development  Bezabih and Holden 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used in the Regressions 
Variable  
Certificate = 0  Certificate = 1  Male head  Female head 
Mean  Std. dev.  Mean  Std. dev.  Mean  Std. dev.  Mean  Std. dev. 
     Socioeconomic characteristics 
Sex of household head  0.099  0.299  0.128  0.334  0.000  0.000  1.000  0.000 
Age of household head  50.877  14.871  49.300 13.932 49.813  14.452 52.811  14.293 
Household head able to 
read  0.076  0.265  0.076  0.266  0.083  0.276  0.018  0.134 
Household head able to 
write  0.377 0.485 0.429 0.495 0.442 0.497  0.083  0.276 
Household head 
illiterate  0.529  0.499  0.474  0.499  0.457  0.498  0.872  0.334 
Adult male labor per 
hectare  1.367 1.261 1.174 1.087 1.297 1.144  1.124  1.478 
Adult female labor per 
hectare  1.323  1.456  1.194  1.125  1.158  1.107  2.097  2.218 
Adult male labor per 
hectare squared  3.458 12.608 2.559 10.169 2.991 11.162  3.448  14.254 
Adult female labor per 
hectare squared  3.868  20.887  2.693  9.200  2.565  11.869  9.313  35.826 
No. of livestock per 
hectare  1.998 2.405 2.359 2.225 2.191 2.115  1.957  3.594 
No. of oxen per hectare  1.709  1.660  1.635  1.626  1.598  1.476  2.245  2.497 
     Physical plot characteristics 
Fertile plot   0.463 0.499 0.545 0.498 0.488 0.500  0.601  0.490 
Medium fertile plot   0.374  0.484  0.356  0.457  0.355  0.479  0.305  0.461 
Infertile plot   0.161 0.368 0.135 0.341 0.155 0.362  0.094  0.292 
Other fertility category  0.002  0.046  0.000  0.017  0.001  0.036  0.000  0.000 Environment for Development  Bezabih and Holden 
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Black soil type   0.412 0.492 0.325 0.469 0.363 0.481  0.446  0.497 
Red soil type   0.432  0.495  0.597  0.491  0.517  0.500  0.427  0.495 
Grey soil type   0.062 0.241 0.040 0.197 0.043 0.203  0.052  0.223 
Sandy soil type   0.025  0.155  0.018  0.134  0.017  0.131  0.018  0.133 
Dark red soil type   0.069 0.253 0.051 0.221 0.059 0.235  0.056  0.231 
Flat slope   0.655  0.475  0.740  0.411  0.699  0.459  0.749  0.434 
Medium slope   0.277 0.448 0.307 0.430 0.250 0.433  0.200  0.401 
Steep slope   0.065  0.247  0.050  0.218  0.048  0.214  0.050  0.218 
Plot distance from 
homestead in minutes 
walking 
19.000 22.505 17.505 20.678 18.402 21.818  17.562  20.646 
Plot size in hectares  0.333  0.270  0.299  0.256  0.319  0.267  0.300  0.244 
Total farm size in 
hectares  1.765 0.953 1.968 1.156 1.922 1.055  1.362  0.935 
     Input application 
Fertilizer in kg/ha  130.478  435.420  231.982  620.780  189.877  530.621  79.423  530.467 
Manure in kg/ha  1886.142  7961.808  1331.350  3141.842 1689.712  6476.631 1148.345  3496.119 
     Tenure security variables 
Household's expectation 
of increase in land 
holdings 
0.143  0.350  0.122  0.328  0.135  0.342  0.122  0.327 
Household's expectation 
of decrease in land 
holdings 
0.295 0.456 0.266 0.442 0.285 0.451  0.252  0.434 
Household's expectation 
of no change in land 
holdings 
0.283  0.450  0.371  0.483  0.321  0.467  0.345  0.476 
Household's expectation 
of uncertainty in future 
land 
0.277 0.448 0.241 0.428 0.258 0.437  0.281  0.450 Environment for Development  Bezabih and Holden 
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     Plot distribution by rental categories 
Self-managed plots  0.793  0.405  0.847  0.360  0.823  0.381  0.779  0.415 
Rented-out plots  0.066  0.248  0.042 0.201 0.038  0.191 0.187  0.390 
     Landlord-tenant relationships 
Tenant is related to 
landlord (male and 
female) 
0.055 0.229 0.047 0.211 0.051 0.221  0.050  0.219 
Tenant is related to 
spouse of landlord 
(male and female) 
0.013  0.112  0.013  0.114  0.013  0.113  0.013  0.112 
Tenant is related to 
female landlord  0.008 0.090 0.003 0.051 0.000 0.000  0.050  0.219 
Tenant is related to 
spouse of female 
landlord 
0.002  0.041  0.001  0.034  0.000  0.000  0.013  0.112 
     Dependent variables 
Share of plots in 
treatment category  0.275 0.446 0.426 0.495 0.455 0.498  0.527  0.499 
Share of plots in 
treatment category if 
Ethyear = 1999         
0.011  0.102  0.013  0.115 
Value of production per 
hectare  6.652 1.122 6.752 1.050 6.719 1.085  6.524  1.116 Environment for Development  Bezabih and Holden 
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With regard to indicators of wealth, such as number of oxen and livestock, 
households in the no-treatment category owned an average of 1.765 oxen per hectare, 
compared to 1.635 in the treatment category. Livestock ownership (measured in tropical 
livestock units) is 1.998 and 2.559 in the no-treatment and treatment categories, 
respectively. The difference in physical characteristics between plots treated or not 
treated does not exhibit a particular pattern, suggesting that the plots in the treatment and 
no-treatment categories are not very different.  
Being in the treatment category increases the proportion of households that see no 
change in their expectation of future land holdings. The proportion of households that 
expect to increase or decrease their holdings, as well as those that are uncertain, is less in 
the treatment than the no-treatment sample.  
 Land productivity measured in terms of the log of value of production per hectare 
is higher in the treatment than the no-treatment group. Similarly, external input 
applications of fertilizer and manure are much higher in the treatment than the no-
treatment category. 
The third and fourth columns in table 3 present the summary statistics of the 
values of the variables of interest differentiated by gender. Female heads of households 
are older and they are more illiterate (87 percent) than male household heads (45 
percent). On average, male-headed households have more adult male laborers, but fewer 
adult female laborers. The number of livestock and oxen per hectare are also greater for 
male-headed households, but female-headed households have both larger family sizes 
and larger plot sizes, on average. The average number of both livestock and oxen is lower 
in the female-headed households. Female landlords were more likely to have blood-
related or in-law tenants. Statistics on physical farm characteristics between male and 
female-headed households suggest that the differences are not significant in all cases. The 
observed outputs are also significantly larger for male-headed households.  
Land productivity is higher for male-owned plots than female-owned plots. These 
gender-based differences are also statistically significant for all plot characteristics, 
although these variables arguably do not account for all the unobservable differences in 
land quality. In addition, relative to men and controlling for farm size, female-owned 
plots actually receive more fertilizer than male-owned plots, although manure per hectare 
tends to be higher for male-owned plots.  Environment for Development  Bezabih and Holden 
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4. Results and Discussion of the Parametric and Nonparametric Analyses 
4.1  Determinants of renting out plots 
The probit results of the determinants of renting out plots are presented in table 4. 
Our results suggest that, overall, renting seems to be dependent on household 
characteristics and there is limited heterogeneity on whether a household leases in or 
leases out plots. Gender has a positive impact on the likelihood of renting out a plot. This 
is in line with arguments by Holden and Bezabih (2008) that female-headed households 
are hugely dependent on renting out for production. Again, reflecting the limited use of 
female labor in agricultural production, households with a large number of adult female 
members are more likely to rent out their land. The opposite effect holds for households 
with more adult male family members per hectare of land. Given limited opportunities for 
hired labor, older households are also likely to rent out their land, as reflected by the 
positive coefficient of age. Households with more oxen and livestock per hectare are less 
likely to rent out land. This is expected because the average land holding in the study area 
is small. Plot characteristics seem to be less important in the renting out decision.  
4.2 Basic Productivity Analysis 
The basic productivity equations analyze the determinants of productivity without 
taking into account the impact of certification. The results in table (4) present this 
analysis in four categories:  pooled productivity regression that includes all the plots, 
pooled productivity regression with Mundlak’s fixed effects, rented-out plots, and non-
rented-out plots. The results show that, across all categories, plots owned by female-
headed households are significantly less productive. This is in line with previous studies, 
which have revealed a gender gap in land productivity (Holden and Bezabih 2008; 
Bezabih and Holden 2009).  Environment for Development  Bezabih and Holden 
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Table 4. Random Effects Probit Determinants of Plot-Renting Behavior 
Variable  Rent out  Variable  Rent out 
Age of the household 
head 
-0.004*** 
Medium fertile plot 
0.045 
(0.001)  (0.078) 
Sex of the household 
head 
-0.242*** 
Infertile  plot  
0.082 
(0.043) (0.076) 
Household head able 
to read 
-0.058 
Black soil  
-0.045 
(0.038)  (0.043) 
Household head able 
to write 
-0.080*** 
Red soil  
0.097* 
(0.023) (0.043) 
No. of adult female 
family members per 
hectare 
-0.048** 
Grey soil  
0.045 
(0.018)  (0.061) 
No. of adult male 
family members per 
hectare 
0.041* 
Sandy soil  
-0.063 
(0.018) (0.084) 
No. of adult female 
family members per 
hectare squared 
0.002 
Steep slope  
-0.002 
(0.001)  (0.044) 
No. of adult male 
family members per 
hectare squared 
-0.001 
Ethyear = 1999 
0.007 
(0.002) (0.042) 
No. of tropical 





(0.007)  (0.153) 





Total farm size in 
hectares 
0.02 
LR Chi2 (20)  701.71 
(0.014) 
Plot size in hectares 
-0.855*** 
Pseudo R2  0.0592 
(0.042) 
Fertile plot  
0.048     
(0.076)     
* = significant at 10%; **  significant at 5%; *** =  significant at 1%   
 
The negative coefficient for gender in the rented-out productivity equation 
indicates that plots owned (and rented out) by female-headed households are operated 
suboptimally, compared to similar plots owned by male-headed households. The lower 
productivity of female-owned plots also implies that female-headed households may lack Environment for Development  Bezabih and Holden 
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the necessary factors of production to work their farms efficiently and are unable to fully 
adjust their cultivated area by renting out a sufficient amount of land.  
Older households are less productive. Education seems to have no significant 
effect on productivity, except for the pooled productivity regression, where it exhibits a 
significant, negative impact. The importance of availability of male labor is shown by the 
positive impact of male adult members of a household in the pooled- and owned-plot 
regressions and the negative impact of female labor in the owned-plot categories. This 
also strengthens our earlier argument that lower productivity of female owned plots may 
be explained by factor constraints, such as labor.  
Tropical livestock units, used as proxy for household wealth, are only significant 
in the owned-plots category and exhibit a negative impact on the pooled regression with 
time invariant covariates. The number of oxen per hectare is a positive determinant of 
productivity. Plot size is a consistently significant and negative determinant of 
productivity, while farm size is only significant in the pooled regression category.  
Of the plot characteristics, fertility is the most important determinant of 
productivity, with all three fertility categories positive and significant. Plots with steep 
and moderately steep slopes are also significant. In the input categories, both fertilizer 
and manure are significant, but with very small magnitudes.  
The presence of significant selection into self-managed and rented-out plots was 
verified by the significance of the inverse Mill’s ratio. This indicates that plots are not 
randomly sorted into rented and self-managed plots. Instead, their selection into either 
category depends on plot and household characteristics. 
4.3 Extended Productivity Analysis 
Table 5 below presents the estimation results of the productivity analysis, 
controlling for the impacts of certification and tenant-landlord relationships for pooled, 
rented-out, and self-managed plots across estimators. The objective of this analysis is to 
see if productivity gaps between male- and female-owned farms can be narrowed by 
certification.  
Table 6 below presents the productivity analysis extended to include certification 
and tenant-landlord relationships. The coefficients, estimated by adding the treatment 
variable and the treatment interacted with gender, represent the certification and the 
impact of certification, given that the head is female. The impact of certification on 
productivity is positive and significant, and results are relatively robust for rented-Environment for Development  Bezabih and Holden 
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out/self-managed and pooled plots, as well as across estimators. The gender and 
treatment interaction is positive and significant for one category only, indicating that 
while female-headed households might have gained modestly from the reform, male-
headed households benefitted much more from certification in terms of productivity. The 
impact of kinship variables is negative and significant for plots owned by women and 
rented out to spouse’s relatives. This implies that female-headed households do not have 
effective command over their relatives as tenants, leading the tenants to exert less than 
optimal effort on their rented-out land. This result is in line with the findings by Bezabih 
and Holden (2009) and Kassie and Holden (2007).  Environment for Development  Bezabih and Holden 
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Table 5. Random Effects and Mundlak’s Fixed Effects Determinants of Productivity (No Certification of Plot) 
Variable Pooled  Pooled
† Rented Rented
† Self-managed  Self-
managed
† 
† Indicates the estimate is the Mundlak’s fixed effect counterpart to the random effects estimation. 
* = significant at 10%; **  significant at 5%; *** =  significant at 1%     
††The prefix “avg_” indicates the average of the time variant variables over the two survey periods. 
Age of household head 
-0.006***  -0.005***  -0.005***  -0.002  -0.006***  -0.005*** 
-(0.001)  -(0.001)  (0.001)  -(0.002)  -(0.001)  -(0.001) 
Sex of household head 
-0.170*** -0.141*** -0.175***  -0.201* -0.177***  -0.141*** 
-(0.034) -(0.034) (0.035) -(0.081) -(0.040) -(0.039) 
Household head able to read 
-0.057  -0.033  -0.065  -0.069  -0.045  -0.029 
-(0.038)  -(0.038)  (0.038)  -(0.092)  -(0.043)  -(0.043) 
Household head able to write 
-0.060** -0.073** -0.070** -0.054  -0.063*  -0.076** 
-(0.023) -(0.023) (0.023) -(0.050) -(0.026) -(0.026) 
No. of adult female members per 
hectare 
-0.029  -0.015  -0.036*  -0.044  -0.046*  -0.015 
-(0.017)  -(0.020)  (0.017)  -(0.056)  -(0.019)  -(0.023) 
No. of adult male members per hectare 
0.033 0.029 0.037*  0.036 0.036 0.028 
-(0.018) -(0.018) (0.018) -(0.057) -(0.020) -(0.020) 
No. of adult female members per 
hectare squared 
0.002  0.001  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.001 
-(0.001)  -(0.001)  (0.001)  -(0.006)  -(0.001)  -(0.001) 
No. of adult male members per hectare 
squared 
-0.001 0 -0.002  -0.002  -0.002  0 
-(0.002) -(0.002) (0.002) -(0.010) -(0.002) -(0.002) 
No. of tropical livestock units per 
hectare 
0.035***  0.025***  0.034***  0.040*  0.034***  0.019* 
-(0.005)  -(0.007)  (0.005)  -(0.017)  -(0.005)  -(0.008) 
No. of oxen per hectare  0.012  0.006 0.021 0.077  0.022  0.012 Environment for Development  Bezabih and Holden 
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-(0.009) -(0.011) (0.012) -(0.042) -(0.013) -(0.015) 
Total farm size in hectares 
-0.071***  -0.197***  0.013  -0.093  -0.065***  -0.217*** 
-(0.013)  -(0.022)  (0.014)  -(0.050)  -(0.016)  -(0.026) 
Fertile plot  
0.049 -0.014  -0.863***  0.305*  -0.011  -0.09 
-(0.077) -(0.076) (0.044) -(0.154) -(0.090) -(0.089) 
Medium fertile plot  
0.04  -0.036  0.042  0.196  -0.001  -0.093 
-(0.079)  -(0.078)  (0.077)  -(0.157)  -(0.092)  -(0.091) 
Infertile plot  
0.12 0.021  0.039  0.246 0.073 -0.045 
-(0.077) -(0.076) (0.078) -(0.150) -(0.089) -(0.088) 
Black soil  
0.022  0.051  0.087  -0.333*  0.115  0.145 
-(0.075)  -(0.074)  (0.076)  -(0.150)  -(0.086)  -(0.085) 
Red soil  
0.163* 0.154* -0.028 -0.102 0.224** 0.218** 
-(0.074) -(0.073) (0.043) -(0.148) -(0.085) -(0.084) 
Grey soil  
0.061  0.107  0.109*  0.03  0.087  0.143 
-(0.087)  -(0.086)  (0.043)  -(0.181)  -(0.099)  -(0.097) 
Dark red soil  
0.025 0.075 0.016 -0.184 0.087  0.146 
-(0.084) -(0.083) (0.060) -(0.176) -(0.095) -(0.094) 
Steep slope  
0.085*  0.064  -0.085  -0.056  0.124**  0.09 
-(0.042)  -(0.042)  (0.084)  -(0.094)  -(0.048)  -(0.047) 
Medium slope  
0.06 0.052  0.039  -0.091 0.107*  0.09 
-(0.042) -(0.041) (0.042) -(0.090) -(0.047) -(0.047) 
Fertilizer in kg/ha 
0.000***  0.000***  0.035  0.000***  0.001***  0.000*** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.041)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Manure in kg/ha 
0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***  0.000* 0.000***  0.000*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
avg_land
††    0.205***    -0.769    0.297 Environment for Development  Bezabih and Holden 
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  -(0.026)    -(0.887)    -(0.454) 
avg_madult
††  
 0   0.013   0.252*** 
 -(0.015)  -(0.059)    -(0.030) 
avg_fadult
††  
  -0.787***    0.064*    -0.018 
  -(0.092)    -(0.029)    -(0.018) 
avg_oxen
†† 
 0.008   -0.060*    -0.001 
 -(0.008)  -(0.025)    -(0.016) 
avg_livestock** 
  -0.000***    -0.004    0.017 
  (0.000)    -(0.012)    -(0.012) 
avg_manure
†† 
 0.000***   -0.000***    -0.000*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.000) 
avg_fertilizer
†† 
  -0.397***    0.000***    0.000*** 
  -(0.029)    (0.000)    (0.000) 
Ethyear = 1999 
-0.416*** 7.080*** 0.000*** -0.388*** 0.178 -0.370*** 
-(0.027) -(0.131) (0.000) -(0.089) -(0.456) -(0.040) 
Constant 
6.961***  7.182***  -0.602  7.717***  -0.399***  6.816*** 
-(0.129)  (0.117)  (0.383)  -(0.545)  -(0.038)  -(0.304) 
N 11162  11162  2085  2085  9077  9077 
R squared  0.1295  0.1197  0.0945  0.0874  0.098  12.89 
 F statistic    51.33  51.29 8.91  8.46  41.93  42.91 
 Prob > F          0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 Environment for Development  Bezabih and Holden 
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Table 6. Determinants of Productivity (Certification, Rent Variables, Difference-in-Difference) 











† Indicates the estimate is the Mundlak’s fixed effect counterpart to the random effects estimation. 
* = significant at 10%; **  significant at 5%; *** =  significant at 1%     
††The prefix “avg_” indicates the average of the time variant variables over the two survey periods. 
Age of household head 
-0.006***  -0.005***  -0.005*  -0.004*  -0.007***  -0.007***  -0.005*  -0.004* 
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Gender of household head 
-0.210*** -0.188***  -0.219*  -0.192*  -0.190*** -0.145**  -0.194*  -(0.169) 
(0.040) (0.040) (0.088) (0.088)  (0.052) (0.052) (0.095) (0.095) 
Household head able to 
read 
-(0.064)  -(0.032)  -(0.143)  -(0.091)  -(0.070)  -(0.048)  -(0.150)  -(0.099) 
(0.038)  (0.038)  (0.092)  (0.092)  (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.092)  (0.092) 
Household head able to 
write 
-0.065** -0.069** -(0.042) -(0.050) -0.063* -0.063* -(0.040) -(0.048) 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.050) (0.050)  (0.026) (0.026) (0.050) (0.050) 
No. of adult female 
members per hectare 
-(0.031)  -(0.016)  (0.028)  -(0.038)  -(0.033)  (0.008)  (0.034)  -(0.033) 
(0.017)  (0.020)  (0.052)  (0.058)  (0.020)  (0.024)  (0.051)  (0.057) 
No. of adult male members 
per hectare 
0.035* (0.026) (0.029) (0.050)  (0.032) -(0.002) (0.005) (0.022) 
(0.018) (0.022) (0.056) (0.065)  (0.020) (0.025) (0.057) (0.066) 
No. of adult female 
members per hectare 
(0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.003)  0.003*  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.003) 
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
No. of adult male members 
per hectare squared 
-(0.001) (0.000) -(0.002) -(0.001)  -(0.002) -(0.001) (0.001)  (0.002) 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.010) (0.010)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.010) (0.010) 
No. of tropical livestock 
units per hectare 
0.033***  0.025***  0.043*  0.038*  0.018*  (0.002)  0.047**  0.041* 
(0.005)  (0.007)  (0.018)  (0.019)  (0.008)  (0.010)  (0.018)  (0.019) 
No. of oxen per hectare  (0.011) (0.008) (0.003) (0.034)  -(0.025) -(0.040) -(0.008) (0.027) Environment for Development  Bezabih and Holden 
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(0.009) (0.011) (0.041) (0.044)  (0.023) (0.024) (0.041) (0.044) 
Total farm size in  hectares 
-0.077***  -0.204***  -0.077**  -(0.080)  -0.081***  -0.246***  -0.083**  -(0.084) 
(0.013)  (0.023)  (0.029)  (0.051)  (0.015)  (0.026)  (0.029)  (0.051) 
Fertile plot  
(0.042) (0.006) 0.303* (0.281)  -(0.051) -(0.099)  0.306*  (0.282) 
(0.076) (0.076) (0.153) (0.151)  (0.089) (0.089) (0.152) (0.151) 
Medium fertile plot  
(0.043)  -(0.010)  (0.214)  (0.191)  -(0.018)  -(0.082)  (0.215)  (0.189) 
(0.079)  (0.078)  (0.157)  (0.156)  (0.091)  (0.091)  (0.156)  (0.155) 
Infertile plot  
(0.122) (0.063) (0.287) (0.263)  (0.077) (0.009) 0.296* (0.270) 
(0.077) (0.076) (0.151) (0.150)  (0.089) (0.088) (0.151) (0.150) 
Black soil  
(0.021)  (0.049)  -0.339*  -0.304*  (0.152)  0.188*  -(0.291)  -(0.261) 
(0.075)  (0.074)  (0.154)  (0.152)  (0.087)  (0.086)  (0.154)  (0.153) 
Red soil  
0.153* (0.143)  -(0.059)  -(0.082)  0.241** 0.239** -(0.015)  -(0.044) 
(0.074) (0.073) (0.150) (0.149)  (0.086) (0.085) (0.151) (0.150) 
Grey soil  
(0.082)  (0.109)  (0.049)  (0.049)  (0.118)  (0.149)  (0.092)  (0.087) 
(0.087)  (0.086)  (0.184)  (0.182)  (0.099)  (0.097)  (0.184)  (0.182) 
Dark red soil  
(0.029) (0.071) -(0.184)  -(0.156)  (0.115) (0.166) -(0.139)  -(0.118) 
(0.084) (0.083) (0.178) (0.177)  (0.096) (0.095) (0.179) (0.177) 
Steep slope  
(0.072)  (0.066)  -(0.077)  -(0.038)  0.144**  0.133**  -(0.085)  -(0.048) 
(0.042)  (0.042)  (0.097)  (0.098)  (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.097)  (0.097) 
Moderate slope  
(0.051) (0.058) -(0.118)  -(0.078) 0.117*  0.118* -(0.132)  -(0.093) 
(0.042) (0.041) (0.091) (0.091)  (0.048) (0.047) (0.090) (0.091) 
Fertilizer in kg/ha 
0.000***  0.000***  0.000***  0.000***  0.000***  0.000***  0.000***  0.000*** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Manure in kg/ha 
0.000*** 0.000***  (0.000)  0.000*  0.000*** 0.000***  (0.000)  0.000* 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Environment for Development  Bezabih and Holden 
 
 
   26
ptreatment 
0.120***  0.121***  (0.020)  (0.007)  0.142***  0.147***  (0.018)  (0.005) 
(0.027)  (0.027)  (0.062)  (0.062)  (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.063)  (0.063) 
fptreatment 
(0.086) (0.073) (0.271) (0.268)  (0.116)* (0.093) (0.367) (0.356) 
(0.066) (0.066) (0.291) (0.288)  (0.072) (0.072) (0.298) (0.295) 
Inverse Mill’s ratio 
    (0.007)  (0.074)  0.286*  0.358**  (0.086)  (0.075) 
    (0.216)  (0.214)  (0.119)  (0.118)  (0.057)  (0.057) 
Tenant is relative of 
landlord (male and female) 
         (0.066)  (0.078) 
         (0.151)  (0.149) 
Tenant is relative of 
landlord  for  female 
            -(0.025)  -(0.026) 
            (0.089)  (0.088) 
Tenant is spouse's relative 
of landlord 
         -0.972***  -0.977*** 
         (0.261)  (0.259) 
Tenant is spouse's relative 
of landlord *for female 
            (0.053)  (0.117) 
            (0.216)  (0.214) 
avg_land
†† 
 0.136***  -(0.034)    0.179***    -(0.038) 




  -(0.001)    0.074*    (0.027)    0.077** 




 (0.004)  -(0.033)    (0.032)    -0.032 
 (0.018)  (0.031)    (0.022)    (0.031) 
avg_oxen
†† 
  -(0.004)    -0.055*    (0.010)    -0.063* 
  (0.013)    (0.025)    (0.016)    (0.025) 
avg_livestock
†† 
 (0.006)  -(0.005)    (0.016)    -0.003 
 (0.008)  (0.012)    (0.012)    (0.012) 
avg_manure
††    -0.000***    -0.000***    0.000***    -0.000*** Environment for Development  Bezabih and Holden 
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  (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000) 
avg_fertilizer
†† 
 0.000***  0.000***    0.000***    0.000*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000) 
Ethyear =1999 
-0.478***  -0.442***  -0.446***  -0.438***  -0.466***  0.413***  -0.493***  -0.481*** 
(0.030)  (0.031)  (0.073)  (0.074)  (0.033)  (0.036)  (0.079)  (0.080) 
Constant 
6.996*** 6.952*** 7.198*** 7.152***  6.596*** 6.483*** 7.118*** 7.092*** 
(0.129) (0.130) (0.342) (0.344)  (0.194) (0.193) (0.343) (0.344) 
N  11162  11162  2085  2085  9077  9077  2085  2085 
R  squared  0.1295 0.1158 0.0832 0.1045 0.1019 0.1225 0.0914  0.112 
 F( 23, 11070)    51.33  46.4  8.24  8.33  40.38  39.13  7.95  8.1 
 Prob > F          0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Environment for Development  Bezabih and Holden 
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4.3  The Semi-Parametric Estimation  
The results of the semi-parametric results are in the appendix in tables A1 and A2. 
The results of the propensity score matching (table A1) show that education of household 
head and number of male and female adults in a household are important in explaining 
participation in certification. The results also indicate that female-headed households are 
more likely to have participated in the land-certificate program. The estimated propensity 
scores from table A1 were used to generate matched observations for treatment and 
control villages, using kernel matching methods (table A2). The matching results show 
that only one observation from the original sample fell out of the matching sample range. 
Hence, we used the original sample in our parametric regression analysis. Our 
measurement of the average treatment effect on the treated category showed that 
productivity has increased as a result of the certification.  
5. Conclusions 
We evaluated the effectiveness of the land certification policy on improving the 
welfare of female-headed households, as measured in terms of plot-level productivity. 
The land certification program in Ethiopia is meant to reduce the inherent 
insecurity of land holdings associated with state ownership of land. It should ease the 
constraints from reduced tenure security, such as limited land market participation, and 
promote better land management and investment, and better production decisions 
associated with an increased sense of ownership. In previous studies, the productivity 
differentials between male- and female-headed households have been explained by 
differences in tenure insecurity (Holden and Bezabih 2008; Bezabih and Holden 2009).  
For female landowners, who are believed to be systematically more tenure 
insecure and more reliant on the land-lease market, the land certification program is 
expected to lead to increased productivity. Thus, it can be argued that interventions that 
lead to an enhanced sense of land ownership and increased participation in the land-lease 
market would boost land productivity of female farmers and, consequently, narrow the 
gender gaps in productivity.  
Our results show that plots owned by female-headed households are significantly 
less productive. This is in line with previous studies that have revealed a gender gap in 
land productivity. This also indicates that female-headed households are unable to take 
full advantage of their cultivated area by renting out sufficient amounts of land. Our Environment for Development  Bezabih and Holden 
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study suggests that certification programs that seek to reduce tenure insecurity and 
increase productivity may have greater effects on male-headed households than female-
headed households. Controlling for the possibility that certification has a different impact 
on male and female productivity shows that male-headed households gain significantly 
and women gain only modestly. Hence, while certification is clearly beneficial to farm-
level productivity, it does not necessarily lead to more gains for female-headed 
households.  
The major policy implication of the study is confirmation that effective land 
reforms do improve the welfare of rural households. The analysis and the results 
presented in this paper help fill a gap in the literature on the role of reforms in improving 
economic performance of rural stakeholders in general, and the impact of certification in 
increasing the productivity of female farmers in particular. The clearest result emerging 
from our analysis is that the tenure-enhancing impacts of certification appear to boost 
productivity, most likely by encouraging proper land management and improving input 
use. Although the impact of certification on enhancing female productivity is less 
consistent across results, it does bring modestly positive changes and shows the potential 
of such reforms in reaching rural women. 
Future studies that relate imperfections in the process of land reforms with 
intended economic outcomes can further illuminate our understanding of the relationships 





Table A1. Logit Estimates of Selection into Certification 
Variable Coefficient  Variable  Coefficient 
Age of household head 
-0.006***  No. of adult male members per 
hectare 
-0.066*** 
(0.001)  (0.019) 
Gender of household head 
0.477*** 
Total farm size in hectares 
0.294*** 
(0.059) (0.021) 
Household head able to write 
0.180*** 
Plot size in hectares 
-0.982*** 
(0.039)  (0.077) 
Other fertility category 




No. of adult female members 
per hectare 
0.004     
(0.016)   
Constant 
 -0.283**   
 (0.087)   
Pseudo R-squared  0.0331     
Observations 11162     
Log likelihood  -9658.92     
Chi2 661.03     
* = significant at 10%; **  significant at 5%; *** = significant at 1%     
 
Table A2. Results from the Propensity Score Matching 
  Treated Controls  Difference  S.E.  T-stat  Total 
ATT 6.771012  6.71998  0.051031 0.023211  2.2  – 
Total no. of 
observations  4,815 5,928  –  –  – 10,743 
No. of observations 
with common 
support 
4,814 5,928  –  –  – 10,742 
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